It is rare that a world leader’s views on a major international conflict have evolved so much, so publicly, and in such a short space of time. In little more than six months, U.S. President Donald Trump has gone from saying he could resolve the war in Ukraine in a day to being openly “disappointed” in Russian President Vladimir Putin for saying one thing and doing another. Trump has also gone from echoing Putin’s talking points about the war to threatening tougher sanctions not only on Russia but also on countries that conduct trade with it.
Diplomacy has so far achieved little. A third round of direct talks between Ukraine and Russia conducted in Istanbul last week ended in less than an hour with no progress. How will Trump’s change of heart—assuming it lasts—impact the course of the war? On the latest episode of FP Live, I spoke with Michael McFaul, a Stanford University professor who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia between 2012 and 2014. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page or follow the FP Live podcast. What follows here is a lightly edited transcript.
Ravi Agrawal: Why has Trump flip-flopped on Ukraine?
Michael McFaul: Well, it is an extraordinary departure. This is not just some tweak in his views. He’s flip-flopped on a lot of foreign policies, but this had been a consistency, especially when he was president the first time around. So what he’s been saying about Putin recently is a big change. And honestly, I am surprised by it.
I think Trump just realized two things. One: His initial strategy for trying to end the war, which I applaud him for trying, wasn’t working. His strategy was to appease Putin and give him everything he wants. It includes keeping Ukraine out of NATO, de facto recognizing the territory that Russia has annexed, and lifting sanctions. These were all being discussed with Putin. At the same time, there was a ton of pressure on the Ukrainians to accept these concessions. It would have been a very bad deal for Ukraine and a very good deal for Putin, but Putin didn’t accept it. Instead, he kept upping the ante. Trump realized this strategy was not achieving the results he wanted.
And second, he looked weak. I’m purposely using that very blunt term because that’s the language those who know the president tell me he doesn’t like: to look weak. I think he finally decided he’d had enough. And so he pivoted, at least rhetorically. We’ll see what actions follow.
RA: I want to explore how the trajectory of the war has changed with Trump’s change of heart. How did things look to you five months ago, when (Ukrainian President Volodymyr) Zelensky came to the White House and Trump infamously talked down to him in the Oval Office, and how would you compare that with the trajectory now, given Trump’s reversal?
MM: Let me take it even a few months before then. I talk to Ukrainians pretty much every day, and when President Trump was reelected, there were people in the government and society that honestly were pleased. They were tired of the Biden administration’s incrementalism. They saw no prospects for ending the war. Donald Trump, they thought, was somebody with a relationship to Putin, which gives Zelensky an excuse to settle for a deal because his hands would be tied. So there was actually optimism.
Then, to your point, that disastrous meeting in the White House was the all-time low in terms of Ukrainians’ hope for a negotiated solution. They thought they had lost the Trump administration. Intelligence was cut off; military assistance was cut off.
But the next point in this drama was the meeting one-on-one between President Zelensky and President Trump in Rome. And from what I hear from the Ukrainian side, they felt like they had reached the president and that he understood what was going on. And that led to what they thought was a turn in the relationship.
Of course, the problem is, now that you’ve decided that you can’t do a deal with Putin, what can you do effectively to change either dynamics on the ground or to create permissive conditions for an actual settlement? And when you start talking about those levers and those mechanisms, I get rather pessimistic. I don’t see a lot of great options for the United States right now.
RA: Trump issued a new deadline of 10 to 12 days to arrive at a deal. But what actually happens over the next couple of weeks? It is not easy to impose sanctions on Russia’s trading partners. India and China are the biggest purchasers of crude oil from Russia, and Russia supplies something like 4.5 percent of the global crude supply. So, this would have a huge impact on global oil prices, which would quickly affect the price of the pump in the United States, which would impact inflation, which Trump doesn’t want.
So it’s unclear whether Trump would want to impose that cost. Even if he does, how much pressure would that actually exert on Putin?
(Editor’s note: A day after this conversation aired, Trump announced a penalty tariff on India for purchases of Russian oil—it is unclear if that will hold.)
MM: I don’t have great answers to those questions. There’s a bill in the Senate and House floating about secondary sanctions, sanctioning supporters of Russia instead of Russia itself, at 500 percent. I was honestly surprised that the president said he was going to do this. He has the authority to do this; he does not need that law. He said 100 percent sanction levels for those that import Russian oil and gas. I hope he’s serious about it, but I fear he’s not. There would be implications for our bilateral relationships. As we’re speaking right now, the delegations from China and the United States are meeting to try to do a big deal. And this would be a giant wrench in that deal.
And secondly, to your other point, this is a boomerang effect, right? The idea is that if we put pressure on China and India, and then the Chinese and the Indians will pressure Putin to end his war. I’m skeptical that would work. I’ve followed Putin for a long time. I first met him in 1991 and dealt with him for five years when I was in the government. And both the Obama administration and the Trump administration thought that he was a transactional leader. But this is not about transactions for Putin. This is an ideological crusade to unite the Slavic nation, to rewrite the wrongs that were done when they lost Ukraine, first with the Bolsheviks in 1917 and then with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. And so I’m skeptical that this kind of pressure will actually lead him to the negotiating table. I hope so, but I’m worried that it won’t.
I’m also worried about President Trump. Making threats and not carrying them through is one of the biggest mistakes you can make in diplomacy. One of my mentors here at Stanford was George Shultz, who was the secretary of state for Ronald Reagan. And George told a story of when he first got his rifle in the Marines, and the sergeant said, “Never point this gun at anyone unless you’re prepared to shoot.” Be credible in your threats. No red lines if you’re not willing to follow through. George always told that story as a very important lesson in diplomacy. And I worry that Trump is pointing his gun but is not ready to shoot. That undermines American credibility, not just in this case, but around the world.
RA: I’m curious what Putin may do going forward. Already, he has dramatically ramped up missile and drone attacks on Kyiv in recent weeks. Given Trump’s reversal, how would you gauge what his strategy might be over the next few months?
MM: First, you’re right that the attacks on Kyiv, and the rest of the civilians in Ukraine, have increased dramatically in the last several months. I actually just had dinner with four Ukrainians who all live in different parts of the country, and they were describing the psychological pressure that has increased as a result.
Second, on the battlefield, the Russians are making incremental gains. They have this new kind of drone, an FPV drone, with a cord connected to it so that it can’t be knocked out of the air through electronic warfare. That is changing, incrementally, the battlefield. That’s the second piece of bad news. The Ukrainians have some new ideas and some new weapons coming, but not yet.
Third, whether you measure his long-term strategy in months or longer, Putin believes that if he just keeps fighting, we—the United States—will eventually lose interest. And tragically he may be right. So he believes that time is on his side.
I’ve tried to look for hints that he might be interested in compromise. But basically, when you listen to Putin closely, he hasn’t changed any of his military objectives from the beginning of the war. I don’t think he’ll change them unless he’s stopped on the battlefield. So I don’t think diplomats will end this war. Ukrainian warriors will have to be what stops the Russian invasion. Wars tend to end in two ways. One side wins, or there’s a stalemate on the battlefield. Neither of those two conditions exist now.
I say this tragically because there’s so many people dying every day, including innocent young Russians. Putin’s just slaughtering his own people because he doesn’t care about them. Ultimately, he’ll keep fighting at least until he has conquered the four territories of Ukraine that he’s already annexed on paper. On Russian maps, they’re already part of the Russian Federation. But on the ground, they are not. I don’t see Putin stopping, at least until he’s tried to conquer those territories.
RA: And I’m curious to hear your assessment of who has more time on their side in this conflict: Putin, Trump, Europeans, or even the Ukrainians?
MM: I worry about American commitment in the Trump era. I’m glad we’re in the moment we are now. I’m glad we are continuing to provide the military assistance that was already allocated by the U.S. Congress and signed by the president. I see few signs of a new bill of that magnitude from the Trump administration. So I worry about the Americans.
I’m more confident in what the Europeans are doing. It is a good sign that they’re taking their own security more seriously and looking for ways to support the Ukrainians in a more fundamental way. In the long term, that’s good for everybody.
But Putin thinks time is on his side. I’m not so sure he’s right about that. I hear a lot of resilience from my Ukrainian colleagues. They hate it. It’s horrible. They’re losing too many soldiers. They worry about replenishing the front lines. People are losing friends and colleagues through these drone attacks on civilians. But I don’t hear capitulation. And tragically, this could go on for a long time without fundamentally reversing the facts on the battlefield.
A decade from now, I think we’ll write about this as a history of how the Ukrainians were invaded, were at risk of losing their entire country and yet resisted to such an extent that they stopped it, preserved their sovereignty, preserved their democratic system of government, have a thriving capitalist economy. I think that will be the history a decade from now. I just don’t know when the fighting will end.
RA: How is Ukrainian President Zelensky managing?
MM: He has one of the toughest jobs in the world, of course. I remember talking to him once about this. There’s nothing worse than being the commander in chief and getting a report every day about how many Ukrainian citizens died because you couldn’t protect them. That is a weight on his shoulders that I cannot imagine.
Second, he’s trying to be inventive to help his warriors fight more effectively, particularly with innovations with drones. When the clock is ticking rapidly, that’s a tremendous pressure as well.
Three, there’s a notion that whatever it takes, by any means necessary, we have to win this war. And at times that’s meant overstepping in terms of presidential authority. We saw that drama last week with the law constraining some of the anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine. But it’s not just about Zelensky; there were demonstrations. Ukraine has a vibrant civil society. And he submitted a new law that will be voted on later this week. Should he have constrained those institutions? No. Did he make a correction? Yes. That tells you the political system is much more democratic and healthy than some critics would like to admit.
RA: If you were advising President Trump, what would you suggest he do?
MM: If I were President Trump or his advisor, I would first be credible about the sanctions that he’s threatened. Second, I would seize the $5 billion to $10 billion of Russian assets sitting in American banks. I would give that money to the Ukrainians. That would help our friends and allies in Europe do the same with even more money that’s there. That, to me, is low-hanging fruit.
Third, he should increase military assistance to Ukraine. This would signal to Putin that we are not going to quit our Ukrainian colleagues. It would help to create the permissive conditions for a cease-fire.
And fourth, this is a fight between autocrats and democrats, which is the title of my future book. If we want to remain the leader of the free world, we have to understand how being strong in Europe will help us look strong in other parts of the world, especially Asia. I was in Taiwan a few months ago, and there’s no group of people in the world looking more closely at what we’re doing in Ukraine than the government and people of Taiwan. They understand how these things are interconnected. It’s not just the right thing to do to free Ukraine. It’s also strategically in America’s national interest.
RA: And what do you think the likely end state to this conflict will look like?
MM: Tragically, I think the end state will be some moment when they agree to a cease-fire. There will not be a peace settlement. There’ll be no recognition of Russian annexation, but rather an armistice of sorts.
And then, the project is rebuilding Ukraine. I think it is critical that negotiations to become a part of the European Union continue and accelerate so that Ukraine can become a rich, wealthy, successful, vibrant democratic country with, by the way, the best army in Europe. Right now, Ukraine is a net importer of security and security assistance. I think they could become an exporter. I can imagine Ukrainian soldiers stationed on the borders of NATO to help NATO deter a future Russian attack. Decades from now, when the part of Ukraine not occupied by Russia is a rich, prosperous, free society, those still living in the captive parts will want to be part of the West, like when Germany reunified.
RA: So for that to happen, we’d need a cease-fire, but we’d also need Ukraine to give up its claims on the territory that it has lost so far. Do you think Ukrainians would accept what you’re outlining here?
MM: They would never accept giving up their territory. They would agree to disagree or to only pursue reunification through peaceful means. You asked me to predict the outcome, not the outcome I wanted.
But Ravi, you’re asking a bigger, harder question. If President Zelensky signed that deal, I’m sure there would be even bigger demonstrations in downtown Kyiv and around other cities. If you look at opinion polls, Ukrainians are not willing to accept that. They are still willing to keep fighting. I had a chance to talk to a very famous soldier from Ukraine, and I asked him your question. He said, “Mike, no. I’m not fighting for democracy in Ukraine or these abstract things that you guys talk about. I’m fighting to avenge the killing of my brothers and sisters.” He said it very starkly. So it’s a very difficult moment for President Zelensky. His soldiers might not all agree with him, which is a real threat for negotiations along the lines that I see as a possible scenario for ending this war.
RA: How much consideration do we need to give to such a high loss of life? At what point do other countries say the Ukrainians, who up until now have been deciding their own fate, are losing too much and so the cost-benefit analysis isn’t working out in their favor?
MM: Ukrainians think about that a lot, or at least senior people in the government do. But their response is, “Maybe that’s the conversation between Ukraine and Europe or Ukraine and the United States, but what’s your conversation with Vladimir Putin? If we capitulate, that doesn’t mean he will capitulate.” It’s a very valid hypothesis that Putin will just keep going. If he sees that they want to quit, it doesn’t mean he will quit. He doesn’t face any pressure inside his country, tragically, even though there’s way more Russians dying every day than Ukrainians.
RA: Why is Putin not facing more pressure, given the losses?
MM: Two things. One, he’s just cracked down on everything. I’ve studied Russia and the Soviet Union for a long time. Russia today is more autocratic, more totalitarian than the late Soviet period. The repercussions for criticizing the regime are much greater. People like Alexei Navalny have been killed. The cost for society to protest is very high.
Number two, why isn’t pressure coming from the regime? It’s the same thing. The regime is so controlled by Putin and his FSB intelligence agents that there’s just no room for it. They infiltrate and control every element of power inside that country, including economic power. There’s lots of disagreements with this war, including from really rich people with a lot of assets in Russia, but their ability to influence Putin is next to zero.
