Don’t Normalize the Nordic Nuke

On Jan. 25, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson confirmed “ongoing discussions with France and Britain” about potentially collaborating on nuclear weapons, going so far as to say that “it is important that there are nuclear-armed powers in Europe.” The United States’ ongoing push for territorial expansion at the expense of Denmark and Russia’s continued resilience to Western sanctions and military aid to Ukraine have brought into question fundamental assumptions about Nordic security. Increasingly, the debate in the region has involved the possibility of developing nuclear weapons.

This, however, would be a mistake. A move toward nuclearization would further destabilize security on the continent while being unlikely to yield any actual bombs.

On Jan. 25, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson confirmed “ongoing discussions with France and Britain” about potentially collaborating on nuclear weapons, going so far as to say that “it is important that there are nuclear-armed powers in Europe.” The United States’ ongoing push for territorial expansion at the expense of Denmark and Russia’s continued resilience to Western sanctions and military aid to Ukraine have brought into question fundamental assumptions about Nordic security. Increasingly, the debate in the region has involved the possibility of developing nuclear weapons.

This, however, would be a mistake. A move toward nuclearization would further destabilize security on the continent while being unlikely to yield any actual bombs.

The Nordic region is just the latest part of the world where the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons has become normalized in response to growing uncertainty about U.S. security commitments. Last year, more than 70 percent of South Koreans surveyed in multiple polls expressed support for an indigenous nuclear weapons program. After Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s tense February 2025 Oval Office meeting, Prime Minister Donald Tusk told his parliament that “Poland must pursue the most advanced capabilities, including nuclear and modern unconventional weapons.”

Other countries are doubling down on nuclear deterrence in different ways. In June, the United Kingdom announced plans to purchase at least 12 F-35A dual-capable fighter jets in an effort to expand its nuclear force. In September, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact that, some speculate, has the potential of extending a Pakistani nuclear umbrella over the kingdom while maintaining ambiguity. Meanwhile, discussions around a so-called “Eurodeterrent” have also been raised as a potential alternative to the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Amid all this, Northern Europe continues to rearm and become increasingly militarized. As a result, the Overton window has shifted to include candid discussions of a Nordic nuclear weapon.

A Nordic bomb is by no means a new idea. During the early Cold War, Sweden developed its own nuclear weapons program in order to guarantee its neutrality. In 1957, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency determined that Stockholm “has a sufficiently developed reactor program to enable it to produce some nuclear weapons within the next five years.” Across the border, Norway—the sixth country to build a nuclear reactor—also flirted with the idea before abandoning it for economic and technical reasons. In 1957, Denmark secretly provided a “green light” to U.S. nuclear deployments in Greenland despite a publicly declared nonnuclear policy. This lasted until 1968, when a nuclear-armed B-52 bomber crashed and spread plutonium-covered debris on the island.

Beginning in the 1960s, however, Finland and subsequently Sweden shifted the region’s focus away from proliferation and toward disarmament. Their nonmembership in NATO allowed them to challenge the logic underpinning the U.S. nuclear umbrella, including by advocating for a Nordic nuclear-weapon free zone (NWFZ).

However, their gradual integration and eventual membership in NATO rendered their anti-nuclear position less prominent and less tenable. During his successful 2024 election campaign, Finnish President Alexander Stubb signaled his willingness to allow for nuclear weapons to be transported through Finland. In May of that year, Kristersson refused to rule out the hosting of nuclear weapons on Swedish soil. As the alliance’s newest entrants, Finland and Sweden became the most open to revising their nuclear postures. So far, founding members Denmark and Norway have officially remained committed to not hosting nukes during peacetime, though in March 2025, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen signaled her openness to reversing this policy.

Swedish officials have also expressed interest in French President Emmanuel Macron’s suggestion of extending France’s nuclear deterrence for the entire European Union. In April 2025, France sent several nuclear-capable Rafale fighter jets as part of its Pégase Grand Nord mission to Sweden’s northernmost air base. But it remains unclear whether Paris would remain committed to such an approach following Macron’s departure from office. Opposition leader and potential future French presidential hopeful Marine Le Pen has argued that “French defense must remain French defense.”

Since U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, European policymakers in general and Nordic ones in particular have advocated increasingly riskier security strategies. On Jan. 10, for example, Finland formally withdrew from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. In this context, an indigenous and independent nuclear deterrent is becoming more openly discussed. Whether it is a Norwegian lieutenant colonel, a researcher at the Swedish Defence University, or Danish political advisors in Copenhagen and Brussels wanting to name a nuke after Thor’s hammer, it is clear that nuclear weapons are no longer a taboo.

Yet despite the region’s many security concerns, now is not the moment for a Nordic nuke.

The first issue is financial. In the absence of foreign provisions or North Korean-inspired sacrifice, the challenges of building a Nordic nuke would be considerable. Martin Goliath, a researcher at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, has warned that a national effort would be “a gigantic industrial project” requiring a command economy.

In 2025, Finland ran a deficit amounting to 4.5 percent of its GDP, with the debt burden expected to reach 90 percent of GDP this year. Though Sweden has healthier finances, its planned 300 billion kronor defense expenditures ($32 billion) will be debt financed. Meanwhile, in Denmark, the governing Social Democrats lost the Copenhagen lord mayoralty for the first time in a century and suffered additional losses to the Green Left as part of the November 2025 local elections. Increased military spending, especially when oriented to a nuclear weapons program, will risk exacerbating the ongoing guns-versus-butter debate that has already resulted in pushback across Europe

Existing reactors are insufficient for the task of producing weapons-grade plutonium, which would require a Nordic country to build a dedicated reactor that would not be used concurrently for electricity generation. The bomb would not be the only major cost. Any delivery method, whether ground- or submarine-based ballistic missiles or nuclear-capable aircraft, would cost billions more to develop. Only by building these as well could any of the Nordic nations avoid ending up, like the U.K., in the position of having a bomb but still being dependent on other countries for delivery.

Past nuclear projects and military procurement efforts also suggest that expectations of timely deliveries are not necessarily warranted. Finland’s Olkiluoto-3 nuclear reactor, built by a French-German joint venture, went online in 2022 at a cost of 11 billion euros ($13.1 billion) despite initially being planned for completion by 2009 for 3 billion euros ($3.6 billion). In 2015, the Swedish Armed Forces ordered two A26 submarines from the Swedish defense company Saab with a planned completion date of 2023, but this has since then been delayed and is not expected to be delivered until somewhere between 2031 and 2035. Meanwhile, costs have nearly doubled.

An alternative—and presumably more cost-effective—path is to establish a joint nuclear program. In an article for the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, security policy analyst and reserve officer David Carlqvist argued for a Nordic “nuclear weapons union” that would be able to pool resources, complement existing French and British arsenals, and contribute to a credible deterrence. Former Danish Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod went further, advocating for a Nordic defense union armed with atomic bombs.

In reality, any pursuit of a shared-command system is highly improbable given the infeasibility of an obvious and workable decision-making mechanism. Would all five prime ministers have to agree to push the button, or only a majority? What authority would military commanders of national militaries play? And would a nuclear response to a nonnuclear attack be permitted?

Sverre Lodgaard, a senior research fellow emeritus at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, was correct when he noted that “the idea that the five non-nuclear Nordic countries could build their own nuclear arsenal and become a single nuclear power is pure fantasy.” Whereas Kofod argues that a Nordic military alliance needs nuclear weapons for credibility, it was in fact the failure to establish the Scandinavian Defense Union in the late 1940s that led to Sweden seeking an independent deterrence.

Even if a Nordic bomb is somehow built, the net result will likely be greater insecurity. The risk of accidental escalation will grow significantly as nukes are placed within close range of one another. The dangers that existed along the inner-German border during the height of the Cold War would potentially be reproduced and escalated along the Russo-Nordic region’s frontiers.

Should the continent emerge with potentially several independent nuclear-armed states, the Kremlin’s nuclear doctrine is also likely evolve and adapt in ways that are hard to predict. Moreover, the risk of sabotage attempts against a Nordic nuclear program should not be ruled out. Nuclear aspirants are often more vulnerable, as they pose a greater potential threat to rivals but have not yet gained the benefits of actual nuclear deterrence. Israeli bombings of Syrian and Iraqi nuclear installations highlight the real danger faced by those building reactors.

Sabotage efforts do not necessarily need to take the form of overt military strikes. Ukraine’s June 2025 covert drone attacks on Russia’s strategic forces, the Nord Stream 2 explosions, the alleged Russian sabotage campaign in Europe, and the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet malicious computer worm that caused physical damage to Iran’s centrifuges all hint at various ways that a Nordic nuclear weapons program could be targeted by Moscow.

Finally, a Nordic nuclear program would inevitably contribute to the already alarming global arms race. Other European countries as well as nations further afield will feel less constricted when those awarding the Nobel Peace Prize also hold a doomsday weapon.

If a Nordic nuclear weapon is neither likely nor desirable, then the growing openness to the idea merely risks creating an unstable environment on the doorstep of the world’s biggest nuclear power. Instead, the Nordics would be better served by seeking to push for renewed U.S.-Russia nuclear arms talks and promoting a Nordic NWFZ while simultaneously refraining from unilaterally changing the strategic environment. Doing nothing is better than doing something foolish.