The Sahel region — a vast semi-arid region flanking the Sahara Desert that spans from coast to coast as a bridge between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa — has emerged as one of the world’s most unstable security environments over the last decade. Security across the Sahel is deteriorating, and the threat of terrorism has grown, engulfing nations like Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad. This has not only affected the civilian population of the region, which has been internally and externally displaced, with an estimated 2,225,904 refugees due to the growing threat of Terrorism, but also has affected the European Union’s security. As terrorists like Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)grow across the region, the EU has been pressured to amend its foreign policy and security to contain the threat, as since the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU’s focus has been on the eastern front, and European presence in the Sahel has since been scaled down.
This article explores the rise of terrorism in the Sahel, its direct and indirect effects on the EU, and the geopolitical complexities introduced by competing external actors such as Russia and China. The article will shed light on how the Sahel’s instability has become an urgent transcontinental concern by analyzing the current security landscape and the EU’s strategic responses.
The Rise of Terrorism in the Sahel, Historical Context, and Root Causes:
The Sahel cannot be understood without understanding its complex historical, social, and economic context. The Arab Spring, which commenced in 2011, toppled authoritarian regimes across North Africa and the Middle East (MENA), including the toppling of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya in 2011. This event is significant to understand the instability within the Sahel, as the once stable region becomes vulnerable to the rise of terrorism, due to the flow of arms and men from Libya to the Sahel, as the once stable Libya under Gaddafi became engulfed in violence and instability.
Since the 2000s, due to the fall of Gaddafi and the flow of arms, many groups like the Tuaregs have challenged the state due to instability, while some other groups, such as JNIM, which is an offshoot of Al Qaeda, have also challenged the state. JNIM is a coalition of Salafist groups that operate in the Sahel and was formed in 2017 through the merger of other jihadist groups. The group pledged allegiance to Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the former leader of Al-Qaeda, and its creation represented the transcendence of local ethno-social barriers in favor of transnational jihad, with many ethnic groups uniting under the banner of JNIM. Like JNIM, many of these groups use tactics like bombings, assassinations, and ambushes across the Sahel to expand their presence. Recently, due to the proliferation of drones making it easier to buy and develop, many of these groups have used these drones for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and propaganda purposes.
The main turning point for the Sahel was the 2012 fourth Tuareg rebellion in Mali, leading to a military coup in Mali due to the weak government’s response. The crisis in Mali, particularly in the uncontrolled northern part, represents one of the fallouts of the Libyan civil war. As the Tuareg started to take control over areas like Gao and Timbuktu, backed by Islamist groups, they declared independence from the state of Mali. The transnational government of Mali requested international support to combat the rebellion, as the rebellion was pushing towards the center. In partnership with African countries, France launched Operation Serval on January 11, 2013, at the request of the Malian government, which deployed 4500 French troops to counter the Tuareg rebellion (Bere p.63). The Main goal of the French government intervention was to assist the government in regaining control over Mali and allow the Malian government to preserve its integrity and independence (Bere p.64). Operation Serval was a huge success tactically as the French-led intervention allowed the Malian army to reverse the gains made by the rebels and Islamist groups, and many towns and cities were recaptured with the rebels and Jihadists suffering heavy losses (Bere p.64). However, while the Operation itself was successful and allowed the Army to regain control over the areas, the underlying issues of instability, corruption, and insecurity remained.
The French launched Operation Barkhane in 2014, which was a counterinsurgency operation aimed at defeating the rebels and terrorists and improving the performance of the local army. However, despite the continuous military presence, violence spread across Mali to other regions/states in the Sahel, like Burkina Faso and Niger. This violence wasn’t contained, with it increasing since 2017 to 2500 incidents in 2022, leading to 6000 deaths. It is hard to characterize France’s intervention as anything other than a failure, with French troops officially ending their operations in Mali and the Sahel in 2022 amidst popular protests against their presence and diplomatic tensions with the Malian junta (Bertrand and Chafer, p.286). This deteriorating security environment, compounded by waning foreign support and growing local discontent, laid the groundwork for a new phase of crisis in the Sahel, marked by escalating jihadist violence and a succession of military coups.
Current Terrorism Landscape and the Wave of Coups in the Sahel:
Over the last 3 years, the African Sahel region has witnessed a wave of coups d’état across countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Mali had two coups in 2020 and 2021, the first of which ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita on August 18, 2020, and was led by Colonel Assimi Goïta. The same thing happened with Burkina Faso, where Captain Ibrahim Traore ousted Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba from power due to the failure to contain the insurgents. Ibrahim Traore represents a new wave of African populist leaders who have denounced the West and the impacts of Colonialism on the country. Many of these Coups have undermined democratic governance and fractured international cooperation between the Sahel and the EU. While France left the Sahel as it didn’t manage to contain the violence with terrorists expanding across the Sahel, its withdrawal was quicker than expected due to the military coup, which forced France out of the region. Just this January, France ended its 60-year military presence in Chad by closing its last military base there due to Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s termination of the defense agreement. As journalist Jeremiah Fisayo Bambi said, “The countries of this region are seeking to establish their agreements and chart their course.”
Today, there is a power vacuum in the Sahel. Where the EU and USA have retreated, China and Russia have filled the void. At the core of Russia’s influence within the Sahel is employing a private military company like Wagner, which has helped the junta fight the terrorists, providing arms and weapons while simultaneously advancing its interests, like resource extraction. An example of this is the Russian company Rosatom is reportedly seeking uranium assets in Niger previously held by the French firm Orano in exchange for military support. Russia’s modus operandi in Africa is to provide security to mining sites, which allows them to sell the narrative that they are working with the country and its people.
The African corps part of Wagner has about 1000 men in Mali, another 2000 in the Central African Republic, and some numbers in Burkina Faso. These deployments have allowed Russia to leverage influence within the Sahel at the expense of the EU. Wagner was first deployed to Mali in 2021 and was heavily welcomed by the Malian government, as the Wagner counterinsurgency program in CAR was highly successful and therefore was likely to be replicated.
While Russia has expanded its military influence within the Sahel, China has filled the void through economic cooperation. China backed the Niger government by extending the Junta a 400 million bailout, undermining the sanctions imposed by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for the junta’s extraconstitutional seizure of power. China is also Niger’s second-largest foreign investor after France and has a current foreign investment of 2.3 billion. While China hasn’t sent military forces like Russia has, it has sent military equipment to Mali and Burkina Faso, which was delivered by China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO).
However, while there has been a void in the Sahel, which has been filled with Russia and China, the military situation hasn’t improved. Far from restoring stability and direct rule, Violence has increased since Russia’s arrival. Between August 2023 and August 2024, analysts Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia noted an “81 percent increase in violence involving Russian mercenaries … and a 65 percent increase in reported fatalities.” Any victories have proven to be short-lived, like Russia and Mali’s recapturing of Kidal in 2023, as just a year later, jihadists launched a coordinated attack on Mali’s capital. Russia’s counter-insurgency program hasn’t stemmed the tide, and they have suffered heavy losses, such as in July 2024, when 84 Russian soldiers and 47 Malian soldiers were ambushed by JNIM, allegedly with help from Ukrainian intelligence. In Burkina Faso, Al Qaeda attacked the base located in the town of Djibo, killing 200 soldiers. This comes after Ibrahim Traore’s comment that Burkina Faso is safe, with the attack proving otherwise. In Niger, 200 Gunmen on motorbikes raided the base in the western town of Banibangou on Thursday, 20 June 2025, injuring 14 other soldiers and killing 34. These developments highlight the failure of Russia and China to work with local actors to defeat the insurgency and bring stability back to the Sahel regions. It is not only dangerous for the already unstable Sahel states, but also the growing violent region threatens to spill over into Europe’s security and migration landscape.
Terrorism and European Security:
The growing threat of violent extremism has posed a significant risk to Europe and the USA, as the Juntas are unable to contain the violence. The instability has caused a vacuum in which violent extremists have expanded, allowing groups like JNIM, which is an offshoot of Al Qaeda and ISIS, to exploit it could posing major threats to the region and beyond, including Europe. While so far there haven’t been any terrorist attacks in Europe that have originated from the Sahel, history has shown us that when terrorists are allowed space and time, they use these opportunities to attack. Not only has the Sahel become a fertile ground for recruiting rootless and disaffected youth into terrorism, but it has also allowed terrorists to regroup, reorganize, and launch attacks. This is why the EU was heavily involved in the Sahel through the EU Sahel strategy, which was focused on security and cooperation between the EU and the Sahel states. EU missions were launched in Niger in 2012, which were focused on civil capacity missions, and it also launched a military training mission for Mali in 2013. Since 2024, the EU has also provided 201 million euros in humanitarian funding, including money for health care, water, sanitation, transportation, and NGO funding. However, since the Coups in the Sahel, funding has been limited, especially in the realms of military support, as Sahel states have kicked out European nations like France and Germany. The issue is that even though Russia and China have filled the void, there haven’t been any improvements in the security of those nations, which has led to displacements and migration toward Europe, leading to security issues.
France and Europe’s involvement within the Sahel has meant that Europe itself has become a target destination for non-state actors. That’s why France, until 2022, considered jihadism in the Sahel to be a key challenge to their security, and the EU placed anti-migration policies at the core of its foreign policy in Libya, the Maghreb, and the Sahel. The International Monetary Fund estimates that in the coming years, there will be a sixfold increase in migration to Europe from the Sahel, and this will increase the pressure on the already strained developed countries in Europe, which had to experienced the 2015 refugee crisis, leading to backlash across the European continent leading to the rise of far right parties. With Libya itself in chaos and unstable, smugglers are free to use Libya as a transportation hub to smuggle Sahel migrants into Southern Europe, mainly into Italy. That’s why the EU needs to continue engaging with the Sahel, as the globalized world we live in means that instability in the Sahel will/be a future problem for Europe.
Rebuilding Trust: A New EU Framework for Sahel Engagement:
At the heart of understanding why the Sahel security and stability are important for Europe is to understand, firstly, why it’s unstable. Terrorism and crime aren’t formed in a vacuum, and there is an underlying issue in the Sahel that allows for Terrorism to thrive and challenge the state. One way to understand this growing terrorist and migration threat is to understand the economies of the Sahel, with the Sahel states’ GDP being one of the lowest in the world, with Niger’s GDP being 447 Dollars compared to 3500 Dollars for Morocco. Many of the Sahel states are still dependent on agriculture to fund their economy, while the service sector accounts for a small part of their economy. In education, the Sahel states are behind their neighboring African states, with only one in two young people literate compared to an average of over three in four across Africa.
However, the most pressing matter for the Sahel states is corruption. Corruption and violence go hand in hand, with corruption fueling violence and flourishing in affected regions. Due to corruption, the security personnel and the army are not seen as guarantors of stability but rather as contributors to it. When security institutions are seen as corrupt, public confidence erodes in the government, which leads to further tensions. Many of the armed groups have entrenched themself in areas where public confidence is low and government corruption is rife. That’s why it’s important to understand that corruption is the instigator and root cause of this conflict, and not just a byproduct.
Therefore, for the EU to address this conflict and find a solution, it needs to have a multifaceted approach towards solving this crisis. It needs to solve corruption first and invest in key areas such as education and services before giving military support. Before the Coup(s), international assistance was focused on giving military arms and equipment to these Sahel states without ever addressing the corruption issue, therefore limiting the capabilities of the Sahel armies to confront the insurgents. The EU should combine security assistance with support for governance reforms, economic development, and climate resilience. This will improve the Sahel armies’ ability to confront the insurgents, as a stable state with low corruption is more likely to be able to solve the crises.
Conclusion:
Growing unrest in the Sahel is not only a local crisis; it is also a transcontinental one, as it has deep implications for Europe in security, migration, and foreign policy. As terrorism deepens and state institutions weaken, Western Africa has become a battleground of diplomatic competition, where Russia and China have filled the power vacuum left by Europe’s growing disengagement from the region. Still, their presence has not slowed the spread of violence, and violence has worsened, with many areas of the Sahel either under direct or indirect control of the insurgents.
For the EU, this is a time to deeply rethink its strategy: tactical military support or reactionary migration policies will not suffice. What’s needed is a new calibration approach spanning across the economy, military, and social services to ensure that the Sahel states can provide stability without major assistance. By abandoning the Sahel, Europe has lost its strategic significance in the region, allowing Russia and China to exploit grievances. France has decreased in popularity across many of its former colonies in the Sahel region, with 59 percent of Malians holding negative views about France. This is in complete contrast to 2013, when the majority of Sahel states supported France intervening. This means that the EU not only has to support these states, but it needs to rebrand its image to ensure that these states are willing to accept the help.
Europe’s ability to withstand and overcome this crisis hinges on its dedication to sustainable, equitable, and forward-looking development policies.
